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hen historians review the changes made 
concerning schools over the course of the 
twentieth century, two things are likely to 
stand out: the dramatic consolidation of school 
districts, leaving fewer, and significantly larger, 
districts, and the rise in unionization of schools.   
Historians may not immediately see the interaction of 
these two things, but it is precisely this interaction 
that increases the importance of new forms of 
competition among schools. The improvement of our 
schools in the twenty-first century is likely to rest on 
developing forms of school choice—vouchers, 
charters, and other institutions—that counteract the 
forces of the twentieth century. 
 
School choice comes in a variety of forms ranging 
from home-location decisions to home schooling. This 
paper considers the underlying concepts behind choice 
and then concentrates on the alternative forms of 
public-school choice that have developed—contrasting 
open-enrollment programs with charter schools. 
 
All consideration of school choice is, of course, com-
plicated by the politics of the situation.
1 This 
discussion focuses on the outcomes of choice and not 
the underlying politics of implementation.   
 
THE CONCEPT OF SCHOOL CHOICE 
 
The expansion of schooling during the twentieth 
century dramatically changed the nature of discus-
sions about schooling in the United States. The 
United States, which led the world’s schooling 
transformation, went from a small, elite system to 
one that was significantly changed in breadth and 
depth. Universal schooling with progressively older 
students became the norm throughout the country.   
 
There was also a dramatic consolidation of school 
districts. In 1937, there were 119,000 separate   
public-school districts. Today, there are fewer than 
15,000.  Over the same period, funding also changed 
dramatically. In 1930, less than ½ percent of reve-
nues for elementary and secondary schools came 
from the federal government and less than 20 percent 
came from states, leaving 80 percent to be raised 
locally. By 2000, the local share was down to 43 
percent, with both federal and state shares rising.   
 
Why is this important? It is reasonable to presume 
that parents of school children were much closer to 
what was going on in the schools 75 years ago than 
they are today.  Small districts that were supported by 
local funds almost certainly must pay attention to the 
needs and desires of their students. But just the 
opposite is likely today. A limited number of large 
districts effectively moves the decisionmaking and 
management of school districts away from the local 
population. Moreover, larger districts mean parents 
have more diverse preferences concerning what they 
want in their schools. Thus, the choice of any district 
is necessarily a compromise among various interests.  
 
Another aspect of the changes in government revenue 
and support has been the overall centralization of 
decisionmaking. As states have become more promi-
nent in funding schools, they have also moved toward 
more centralization of decisions about operating 
them. This is natural because, if they are going to 
fund schools, they do not want their state (or federal) 
funds to be wasted. But again, the result is that school 
decisions have migrated away from the parents and 
local voters and toward state bureaucracies.     
 
The small school districts found at the beginning of the 
last century show one way in which schools can be 
responsive to their constituencies. If the schools deal 
with a limited number of parents and if the parents 
directly control the funding of the schools, parents can 
exert some influence on what the school does. 
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The responsiveness of districts would not require 
direct consultation with all of the parents.  Tiebout 
(1956) suggested that parents could satisfy their 
desires for local governmental services by shopping 
for the jurisdiction that provided the best level of 
services for their individual desires. Thus, by sorting 
out across places, parents could group together to 
ensure more homogeneous demands. Moreover, since 
one aspect of schools is how effectively they use their 
resources, competition for consumers could pressure 
schools to improve their performance and efficiency.   
 
This view of shopping across alternative jurisdictions 
does, however, have limitations. For a variety of rea-
sons, the public schools might not look too different 
from each other. The central state restrictions, the 
limited viewpoints of school personnel, and other 
factors could lead schools to be quite similar in 
approach, curriculum, and goals. 
 
The contraction of choices of different school dis-
tricts, along with the other choice aspects of home 
location, thus put natural limits on the Tiebout choice 
that can go on in many areas of the country. Restoring 
the ability of parents to enter easily into the schooling 
process will depend crucially on developing and 
sustaining new ways for them to exercise choices. 
 
Expanded choice in schools was first promoted in 
Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom (1962). 
He argued that government may want to intervene in 
the area of education for a variety of reasons, but none 
of the potential reasons, including ensuring a minimal 
level of education by the population or enabling the 
children of the poor to attend schools, requires 
government actually to run the schools. The now-
obvious alternative identified by Friedman is providing 
vouchers to parents. These vouchers would transfer 
funding to the school that a parent chooses, allowing an 
alternative to the Tiebout choice of schools. 
 
The fundamental idea, underlying either form of 
choice, is that freeing up consumer demand can have 
a variety of beneficial effects. Consumers can select 
the alternative that best meets their interests and 
desires. Importantly, since few consumers like over-
priced goods, such demand pressure could lead to 
efficiency and innovation in education.  If one school 
did not provide good value, it would tend to lose 
students to a competitor that offered more for the 
level of spending.  And it is precisely these incentives 
that are most important in assessing school choice. 
 
With some exceptions due to special circumstances 
such as the Cleveland situation, the voucher idea has 
yet to be met with much policy success.  Perhaps the 
most obvious factor is the rise of teachers’ unions. At 
the time of the original suggestions of vouchers and 
the related significant changes in schools, unions 
were not pervasive. Their subsequent rise and 
increase in power has forever changed the ability to 
introduce any radical policy in schools.  Specifically, 
a fundamental precept and implication of competition 
in schools is that the job security of some current 
personnel would be threatened. This result is 
anathema to unions, which have vigorously attacked 
any hint of even experimenting with choice. They 
have been very effective at resisting any such change, 
mounting powerful media campaigns to prevent 
citizen referenda on vouchers from being adopted.   
 
A particularly effective argument in the public-
relations war over vouchers states that giving money 
to private schools would harm public schools and that 
we should instead be working to improve public 
schools. A second argument states that private 
schools are not under the control of the government 
and are not accountable for the government funds 
they receive.  The following sound-bite summary has 
been the mantra of a number of people: “I favor 
choice, but it should be restricted to public-school 
choice.” This position has been particularly popular 
among politicians who want to protect the existing 
public schools from any competitive pressures while 
still seeming open to more fundamental school 
reforms. 
 
Yet citizen sentiment for expanded choice has 
generally increased over time, and this has led to a 
variety of innovations in school choice that fit the 
notion of public-school choice. Importantly, they are 
not all the same, and they have very different incen-
tive effects. Two quite different kinds of choice stand 
out: open-enrollment or magnet school plans and 
charter schools. It is useful to review these in terms 
of outcomes and incentives.
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PUBLIC-SCHOOL CHOICE 
 
A particularly popular version of public-school choice 
involves an open-enrollment plan. For example, any 
student could apply to a school in his or her district  
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Since the nation’s first charter-school legislation was 
enacted in Minnesota in 1991, 41 states and the 
District of Columbia have passed legislation that 
provides for charter schools, although some had yet 
to open any schools by 2004. For the nation as a 
whole, charter schools increased from a handful in 
1991 to nearly 3,200 schools serving almost 800,000 
students, or over 1.5 percent of the public-school 
population, in 2004. In some places, charters have 
become quite significant. For example, in the 2003–04 
school year, almost 17 percent of students in the 
District of Columbia, 8 percent in Arizona, and 4 
percent in Michigan attended charter schools.
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other than the one to which he or she was originally 
assigned. Or, in a more expansive version, no initial 
assignment is made, and students apply to an ordered 
set of district schools. A common version of this has 
been the use of magnet schools that offer a specialized 
focus such as college preparatory or the arts. 
 
Forms of open-enrollment plans were the response of 
a number of Southern districts to the desegregation 
orders flowing from Brown v. Board of Education.  
In general, simple open-enrollment plans did not 
satisfy the court requirements for desegregation, but 
magnet schools (with racial-balance restrictions) 
became a reasonably common policy approach 
(Armor 1995). In 2001–02, 3 percent of all students 
attended a magnet school (Hoffman 2003). 
 
To date, studies of the outcomes of charters have 
been limited by some serious analytical difficulties.  
Because the students voluntarily choose these 
schools, it is always difficult to infer the impact of 
the school as distinct from the characteristics of the 
students it attracts. Additionally, because charter 
schools are largely new, most are still going through 
a start-up phase, and it takes large inferences to know 
what they will look like in the steady state. 
 
As a general rule, open-enrollment plans produce few 
of the incentives that lie behind voucher plans. The 
flow of students is heavily controlled by the common 
restrictions that space must be available and that 
other requirements, such as racial balance, must be 
met.  Most importantly, however, these plans seldom 
have much effect on incentives in the schools.  Under 
open enrollment, personnel in undersubscribed 
schools generally still have employment rights and 
would simply move to another school with more stu-
dents.  Extending open enrollment across districts 
conceptually provides stronger incentives but unat-
tractive funding, and the “if there is space at the 
school” clause generally stops all but some token 
movement.    
 
My own work provides some preliminary estimates 
of the performance of charters in Texas (Hanushek, 
Kain, Rivkin, and Branch 2005).  The simplest design 
for dealing with selection problems is to compare the 
average learning growth for individual students when 
in the regular public schools with their own 
performance in the charters. In this way, charter 
students become their own control group.   
   
A different development—charter schools—appears to 
offer stronger choice incentives. These schools differ 
dramatically by state, but their essential feature is that 
they are public schools allowed to operate to varying 
degrees outside of the standard public schools. They 
are schools of choice, surviving through their ability to 
attract sufficient numbers of students.   
Three things come out of this in terms of quality in-
dicators. First, on average, charter schools perform 
very similarly to the standard public schools. But 
second, start-up problems are real, and new charters 
do not perform as well as more established charters, 
(those over two years in age), which, on average, 
outperform the standard public schools of Texas. 
Third, there is a significant distribution of perform-
ance across both regular public and private schools. 
The good are good, and the bad are truly bad.   
 
Charter schools can offer true competition to the regu-
lar public schools because they can draw students 
away from poorly performing regular publics. 
Employment rights typically do not transfer between 
charters and regular publics, so personnel in charter 
schools could be under pressure to attract students. 
The pressure on regular public schools comes from the 
potential loss of students, which would lesson the 
demand for public schools and their teachers.   
 
These findings are consistent with much of the other 
recent work, although there are some remaining 
uncertainties. The average North Carolina charter 
appears less effective than the average traditional 
public school (Bifulco and Ladd 2004), while the 
average Florida charter is on par with the regular 
public schools after a start-up phase (Sass 2005). On  
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the other hand, relying upon comparisons between 
charter applicants in Chicago who were randomly 
accepted or randomly denied admission, Hoxby and 
Rockoff (2004) conclude that the three charter 
schools they observed significantly outperformed 
their standard-school counterparts. But these results 
await both the general maturation of more charter 
schools and the investigation of their performance in 
different settings. 
 
Another important aspect of competitive markets is 
the enforcement of discipline on the other partici-
pants—in this case, the regular public schools.  Is 
there any evidence that the regular public schools 
respond to the pressures of competition? Again, it is 
very early in the development of charters, but Hoxby 
(2003) introduces preliminary evidence that there are 
competitive improvements. 
 
Our Texas study also provides information on 
competition. If we look at the behavior of parents, we 
find that they are significantly more likely to with-
draw their children from a poorly performing charter 
as compared to a well-performing charter (Hanushek, 
Kain, Rivkin, and Branch 2005). This finding is par-
ticularly important because parents are not given 
information on the value-added of their charter 
school. The behavior of parents shows, however, that 
they are good consumers and that they can use the 
performance data that are available to infer the qual-
ity of the school. An early and continual criticism of 
the voucher idea is that parents are not good 
consumers, an assertion belied by the data.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The idea of school choice is a natural extension of 
arguments about the benefits of competition to edu-
cation. The clearest form, advocated originally by 
Milton Friedman and picked up by a wide variety of 
other people, is to give parents vouchers that allow 
them to shop for schools. While special circumstances 
have led to the use of vouchers in Milwaukee, 
Cleveland, and the District of Columbia, their growth 
has been slow and erratic.   
 
On the other hand, alternative forms of choice—
under the banner of public-school choice—have 
become more pervasive. Some, but not all, of these 
alternatives offer benefits that are similar to vouch-
ers. Most notably, charter schools offer students and 
parents the possibility of options that have the 
ancillary advantages of introducing competitive 
incentives for schools. 
 
Charter schools are difficult to evaluate. Because 
students self-select into these schools, it is difficult to 
separate the quality of the students from the quality 
of the charter school. Moreover, most charter schools 
started very recently, making it difficult to see how 
they will evolve as they age.   
 
Nonetheless, the best available evidence available 
indicates that, after a start-up period, charters have as 
much value-added as regular public schools—if not 
more. As with regular public schools, however, there 
is a wide range of quality in charters. But, 
importantly, parents appear able to recognize the 
quality of charter schools and to act upon that 
information by exiting low-quality charters at 
significantly higher rates than higher-quality charters. 
 
Current personnel in the regular public schools resist 
expansion of charters, which they consider undesir-
able competition. This resistance takes a variety of 
forms. In some states there are strong pressures to 
limit the number of charter schools. In others, argu-
ments that all schools should have a “level playing 
field” are used to justify increasingly stringent 
restrictions on the operations of charters. If we are to 
obtain the benefits of choice and competition, these 
pressures should be resisted. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 For example, the teachers’ unions, as part of their 
resistance to competition, gained national publicity 
for their simple comparison of scores for students in 
charter schools versus those in regular public schools 
(Nelson, Rosenberg, and Van Meter 2004).  More 
serious work, however, has concentrated on adjusting 
for the special populations that opt for charter schools 
and other choice schools. 
 
2 One very different option not covered here is home 
schooling. A significant number of parents have 
simply withdrawn their children from the regular 
public schools and have taken personal responsibility 
for their education (but with no governmental 
financial support). Some estimates put the numbers 
of home schoolers between 1.5 percent  and 2 percent 
of all school children, although there is uncertainty 
even about the numbers involved (Henke, Kaufman, 
Broughman, and Chandler 2000).  Little is known 
about this in terms of movements in and out or of 
performance, and the incentive effects for most 
existing public schools appear small. 
 
3 Data from the Common Core of Data of the 
National Center for Education Statistics 
(http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/bat/index.asp). 
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